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Introduction 
As a consequence of anarchy and the insecurity in the international system, the United States 
promotes, supports, and defends democracy. In an anarchic international system, the putative 
assurance of security for any state is indeed power. The United States retains a salient position in 
the international system as a formidable military power. To assure its security in the world the 
United States relies on a preponderance of power, and promotes its own form of governance, for 
it has proven competent—thus decreasing anarchy. Therefore, if democracy is promoted in this 
world, then it is indeed a logical consequence of ubiquitous anarchy—a cause of war in many 
cases, that is amongst power rivals. What is more, if in fact a state is coerced, then, to be sure, it 
was a logical result of proving baleful. If, however, the state is in fact competent, then, there is 
indeed no good reason for coercion. To be realistic, the logical contrapositive is, admittedly, not 
the world we live in; instead, it is, in this case, a world where coercion was indeed necessary. A 
negative corollary, incidentally, was engagement, and by this I mean, the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq—a costly resolution for U.S. National security. 
The U.S. National Interest 
The U.S. national interest is, in fact, for the United States to conduct foreign policy in the interest 
of its citizens, and the state relative to other states.[1] What is more, promoting its ideology, as 
democracy’s existence in the world is vital to the future of the ideology—as well as the United 
States. There are three components of the national interest. First, is ensuring the security of the 
United States by acquiring power, specifically military power. Second, is sustaining economic 
prosperity, that is, of the United States and its allies, and moreover, facilitating the cooperation of 
those states that serve this vital interest. Third, is indeed maintaining the stability of the world. In 
aggregate, these three components serve as the interests of the most puissant state in the world, 
the United States of America. 
U.S. Primacy and Security 
The history of peace among democratic states, and the restraint presented by this sort of 
government indeed explains the decreased uncertainty amongst democratic states, whereby the 
uncertainty of a states action can lead to strategic miscalculation, and subsequently war.[2] The 
peace between democracies is unique to that type of state, for other types of like societies have 
comprised the majority of the international system in the past;[3] however, this did not ensure a 
peace. Indeed, democracies are perceived as dovish.[4] 
The democratic peace is a noble avenue of research; however, the focus of the paper is the 
merits of democracy promotion. A distinct domestic political structure produces a unique process, 
and consequently a distinctive behavior.[5] As such, a domestic political structure that can be 
compared to that of other states will have similar behavior as a result of this common structure, 
though homogeneity shouldn’t be expected.[6] As discussed before the system is unipolar, in fact, 
the United States is the primus interes pares. As a direct consequence to the structure of the 
system being unipolar, the United States determines successful and unsuccessful behavior[7]. 
The United States’ actions have demonstrated that it rewards democratic states, and adhering to 
liberal norms. States indeed have a survival motive, however, if a certain domestic political 
structure labeled democracy is rewarded in a unipolar system, then a reward could come in the 
form of security guarantees, thus, the democratic peace is the rational consequence of a powerful 
state rewarding that form of governance, instead of a peace among similar domestic political 
structures.[8] 
Competent states perceiving the international system correctly conform to the structure of 
domestic politics that the most puissant state rewards. As the direct result of this, liberalizing 
occurs at the interstate level with the United States’ influence. If the democratic peace is to follow 
logically from rewarding a particular domestic political structure, then the domestic structure must 
conform to the apotheosis of governance, a western-style democracy, for as Waltz posits, 
"Anarchy is seen as one end of a continuum whose other end is marked by the presence of a 
legitimate and competent government."[9] Therefore, just being a democratic state does not 
ensure a democratic peace, since not all democratic states are equal. Instead, non-cartelized 
democratic states as set forth by Snyder is the ideal.[10] For a non-cartelized democracy is 
indeed rational; that is, in the international arena, as the military lobby rarely influences non-
cartelized democracies. 
Wilhelmine Germany[11] despite having all of the qualities of a model democracy, was highly 
cartelized, and as the principal consequence of this the country went to war.[12] The ideal type of 
domestic political structure would be non-cartelized, and thus not susceptible to logrolling.[13] 
Democratic states have strategic interests all the same as other states[14]; however, upholding 
liberal democracy appears as if it could be explained as a realist, or survival interest, for the 
unipolar system rewards those states that conform to a conception of effective governance, with 
security incentives. As a result of states conforming to appear more similar to this archetype of 
domestic governance, there is indeed less anarchy, whereby the anarchy in the international 
system is proportional to the number of incompetent states. 
In international politics, there is indeed no state amongst states, thus states in the international 
system divested of all attributes except for power capabilities, and differentiated by domestic 
political structure, act in an anarchic world. However, the assertion is that the United States as a 
salient military power acts as a leader of all states.[15] As a consequence, the United States 
promotes democracy as the sole domestic political structure, for this type of domestic political 
structure is competent. Therefore, states that—accurately perceiving the unipolar system, and the 
rewards of conforming their domestic political structure to a Western model—do in fact 
bandwagon rather than balance the United States[16] In the end, there are states with competent 
governments in the international system, and as a result of this, there is indeed less anarchy.[17] 
The United States, ever since Wilson, has promoted this particular domestic political structure on 
its merits.[18] Still, another international relations scholar, Michael Doyle, who is discussed below, 
provides evidence to substantiate democracy promotion as an integral part of the United States’ 
national security strategy. 
The promotion of liberal ideas at the interstate level is indeed a means to achieve an end. Strictly 
speaking, the end is less insecurity. Indeed, political institutions naturally form to sustain, and 
foster, liberal ideas at the domestic level of states within the international system.[19] Thereby, 
conforming those states to the archetype of competent governance, western democracy—that is, 
when states accurately perceive the international system. Doyle posits a liberal international 
theory, and in consequence to this theory, relations between states would indeed be pacified. In 
fact, Doyle argues for two specific principles, which in conjunction and taken as principles that 
states will respect, are relative to one another, thus providing a foundation for liberal international 
theory: 
The basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from 
foreign intervention. Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that 
democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence. Mutual respect 
for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory. When states respect 
each other's rights, individuals are free to establish private international ties without state 
interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants and educational exchanges among 
scholars then create a web of mutual advantages and commitments that bolsters sentiments of 
public respect.[20] 
As the net result, the merits of democracy promotion are not based on the United States’ affinity 
for democracy; instead, democracy promotion is substantiated by Doyle's liberal international 
theory. 
The international system becomes much simpler in a unipolar world, where a single superpower 
has a vision for the international system. The United States is a puissant military power; and 
moreover, democracy promotion has been an intrinsic component of U.S. foreign policy since it 
attained this salient position relative to other states.[21] The United States is fortunate, for the 
United States has been clearly perceived as a superpower since World War II; however, 
maintaining U.S. primacy through the Cold War was a daunting task, as the world became 
bipolar.[22] Yet, after the Soviet Union’s fall the international system became unipolar once more. 
Throughout this distinct epoch, from Wilson to the Bush Administration, each successive 
presidential Administration has either promoted democracy, or supported this form of governance 
as a means to an end. If the means is democracy, then the end is, strictly speaking, stability and 
less anarchy. 
Waltz argues that liberal international theory, an inside out theoroy, is a myth, and is, moreover, 
an egregious myth. Inside out theory is, in fact, where the domestic political structure of a state 
will determine its foreign policies, thus, if a state's domestic political structure were liberal, then as 
a special result the state will pursue liberal foreign policies.[23] Regrettably, inside out theories 
are indeed vitiated, when considering liberal states in an anarchic international structure, for there 
is no governing authority; that is, there is no state amongst states to compel. But this article 
asserts that in a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar structure states that perceive the structure of the 
international system may liberalize their domestic political structure, for the United States rewards 
those states as this is considered successful behavior by the United States, a dominant military 
power in the international system since WWII. Therefore, the democratic peace is achieved 
through the power of a state capable enough to have others conform to an archetype that was set 
forth, with the powerful state rewarding the behavior with support. 
Doyle contends that U.S. power is insufficient, therefore, to have a democratic peace as a 
corollary.[24] In the past, the United States may not have had the wherewithal to prevent 
challenges to its interests; however, the United States has proved its ability to maintain security, 
as it is has sedulously dealt with terrorism and rogue states after September 11th, and more 
precisely, in Iraq where the United States acted unilaterally to ameliorate its security concerns. 
Thus, the United States has demonstrated its ability to maintain security relying on a 
preponderance of military power. According to Walt, it is indeed diaphanously clear the United 
States is capable of maintaining security, for the United States has prevented armed conflict 
between European states.[25] 
Bush Doctrine 
The Bush Doctrine was indeed the United States’ national security strategy, under which, to 
achieve security in an insecure world, the United States relied on three fundamental pillars: 
preventive war, unilateralism, and regime change. It was, in fact, a more aggressive and 
proactive foreign policy strategy relative to the national security strategies of previous 
Administrations.[26] The Bush Doctrine aimed to achieve the United States’ sensitive security 
concerns in an insecure world, as rogue states and terrorism posed compelling security concerns. 
The United States coerced states that did not adhere to international norms, sponsored terrorism, 
and which were determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction.[27] The United States 
coerced rogue states that failed to comply on security issues with the threat of war to change their 
behavior; and, when diplomacy failed, the United States followed through on the threat.[28] And 
to be sure, the United States did follow through on this threat, that is, when a minatory state fails 
to comply, as instantiated by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush Administration, 
unlike preceding Administrations, no longer treated terrorists as if they were committing crimes; 
instead, terrorists were dealt with as the irregular troops at war with the United States.[29] 
The Bush Doctrine was based on three pillars. The first pillar was in fact a moral argument, where 
the United States was now in a Manichean struggle between good and evil. The second pillar 
reevaluated the United States’ approach regarding terrorism; as a direct result, terrorism was no 
longer perceived as byproduct of economic factors. As such, the United States determined that it 
was because of political oppression rather than poverty and hunger that bred terrorism, thus, 
regime change would be apposite, as it would give Islamic states the freedoms they want and 
deserve, in addition to ameliorating U.S. security concerns regarding terrorism.[30] The third pillar 
on which the Bush Doctrine was based was preventive war in those instances where it was the 
United States’ strategic imperative.[31] In the aggregate, the pillars of the Bush Doctrine 
delineated the United States’ strategy to promote peace and stability, especially in the Middle 
East, as this part of the world is currently, and has historically been a cause of concern. 
Balance of Threat 
Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory would predict that states, including the United States, will 
ally with or balance against the most threatening power rather than the greatest power in the 
international system. Whether a state constitutes a threat is a determination made on the 
following factors: aggregate power, proximate power, offensive capability, and offensive 
intentions.[32] In short, rogue states, though lacking in aggregative powers and offensive 
capability, have offensive intentions; in fact, offensive intentions is what gives these states an 
aggressive perception rather than aggregate power. The United States reassessed what 
constitutes a threat in the international system as a result of the September 11th attacks, and 
formulated a national security strategy to ameliorate its security vis-à-vis these threats. Indeed, as 
the direct result of this, the United States determined that rogue states require balancing, for 
either these states have used their capabilities to harm the United States, or their offensive 
intentions have the potential to pose future security concerns. 
When Walt talks of aggregate power it is indeed a state's capability to potentially threaten a state; 
in fact, aggregate power includes population, technology, and industrial and military 
capability.[33] Proximate power is a states geographic location relative to other states, for a 
state's power wanes over distance, hence a state that is in close proximity to another state, has 
the ability to menace a particular state more than a state that is far away.[34] Offensive power is 
indeed defined as a state's salient offensive capability, which provokes alliances. What is more, a 
state that appears aggressive may provoke other states to balance against them based on 
offensive intentions.[35] In the aggregate, these four components of Walt’s theory indeed help 
predict which states pose a threat. 
Coercion 
The Bush Administration has used blackmail to coerce threats, and consequently, change the 
behavior of rogue states. Blackmail is indeed a coercive threat that uses intimidation, not the use 
of force, to produce a desirable outcome.[36] The threat of U.S. force is not a commitment, for the 
United States’ action is conditional on the action or inaction of the threat. Subsequent to 9/11 the 
desirable outcomes relative to three different states were for Afghanistan to turn over Bin laden 
and shut down terrorist camps; for Iraq to halt its nuclear program; and, moreover, for North 
Korea to stop proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To be clear, the threat of war is 
favorable to the use of force, for there are indeed costs associated with conflict; however, in the 
case of Afghanistan and Iraq, each state proved unreasonable, as both failed to comply with U.S. 
demands. Therefore, Afghanistan and Iraq chose the mostly costly option by failing to comply 
with U.S. demands. In the end, the United States’ conditional threat of war became a 
commitment, for the United States fought wars with both Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
U.S. National Security 
If the United States is indeed a puissant military power, and moreover, the structure of the 
international system indicates that the world is unipolar, then the Bush Doctrine is appropriate for 
the United States’ power position, and in fact, the U.S. national security strategy is apposite for 
this the current era. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were indeed applications of the Bush 
Doctrine. What is more, these two wars were examples of U.S. power, thus demonstrating the 
credibility of any threat the United States makes to another state. Preventive war, unilateralism, 
and regime change are indeed principles to exercise the United States’ military power. 
Afghanistan supported the bin Laden-led terrorism efforts to attack the World Trade Center, and 
as a rational consequence the terrorist attack threatened U.S. interests.[37] The United States is 
indeed powerful; however, it is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In short, Afghanistan’s Taliban 
government aided Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization that attacked the United States The Taliban 
government when approached on the issue of terrorism, failed to comply with U.S. requests. The 
United States asked for Osama bin Laden, and for the Taliban government to close terrorist 
camps.[38] However, the Taliban government was irrational, and thus war was indeed politics 
achieved by another means (see Figure 1).[39] 
Figure 1 
 
Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory would predict balancing against an irrational Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan had limited offensive capabilities; however, the state had supported Al Qaeda 
terrorists. Consequently, Afghanistan’s offensive intentions, that is, aiding terrorists whose aim is 
to attack the United States, was perceived as aggressive and threatening. After September 11th, 
Afghanistan would prove the most threatening state for its support of Al Qaeda. Thus, Walt’s 
theory when applied to these circumstances predicts balancing behavior by the United States to 
ameliorate its security concerns; that is, in addition to states allying or expressing support for the 
United States, for the state was attacked by the most threatening power in the international 
system.[40] 
International support for the United States, in consequence to U.S. military action in Afghanistan, 
is indeed easily demonstrated, for there were numerous offerings of solidarity from allies in 
Europe, and moreover, on September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1368 
condemning the actions of "those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the 
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts." To be clear, the UN authorized action to 
this threat; however, the authorized action was ambiguous. In any case, the United States 
responded with U.S.-led coalition forces. Thus, the offensive intentions of Afghanistan were 
threatening, for the Taliban government openly supported Al Qaeda.[41] As such, the 
international community expressed support for action against the Taliban government. 
If, then, Afghanistan were rational, Afghanistan would appease the United States by turning over 
bin Laden and shutting down all terrorist camps. Alas, Afghanistan resisted, and moreover, the 
U.S. threat of war became a commitment, for Afghanistan would continue to pose a security risk, 
as the September 11th terrorists were linked to Al Qaeda. The Bush Doctrine’s application in this 
case appropriately dealt with the security risk using political influence, preventive war, and regime 
change. Afghanistan was a rogue state that was not deterred by the threat of war; however, 
regime change served U.S. security interests. 
To be frank, Iraq also posed a security concern to the United States post-9/11, and to be sure, 
the U.S. national security strategy was sufficient to deal with this threat.[42] The argument is 
made by discussing the Saddam-led regime’s history of aggressiveness in the context of a post-
9/11 world, where U.S. security concerns were sensitive. Iraq has had a history of aggressive 
behavior, as it waged war against Iran throughout the 1980s in addition to invading Kuwait in 
1990. What is more, the regime pursued WMD in the 1990s and early in the twentieth century to 
gain power relative to other Middle Eastern states and eventually assert itself as a regional power 
in the process. However, the process of Iraq asserting itself as a regional power would involve 
war; thus, Saddam’s ambitions threatened peace and security in the Middle East. 
The United States since the Clinton Administration had determined that regime change in Iraq 
was the panacea for the problems that Saddam’s Administration posed. In 1998, the Iraq 
Liberation Act documented Saddam’s use of chemical weapons, and discussed Iraq’s WMD 
programs. Clinton had branded Iraq as a rogue regime that had ambitions that could not be 
deterred. As a logical consequence, the Clinton Administration launched Operation Desert Fox, 
which was a strategic military mission to destroy the Saddam-led regime’s WMD capacity. 
However, the extent to which Saddam had a WMD capacity was indeterminable as U.N. 
inspectors were ejected in response to the attack, and were not allowed back until November 
2002. What is more, U.S. intelligence and reports by UN inspectors from 1997-1999 had 
concluded that information concerning Saddam’s weapons program was inconclusive; therefore, 
there was uncertainty as to Iraq’s capabilities. 
What made the Saddam-led regime a baleful rogue state was indeed its history of war with Iran, 
and Kuwait, as well as its WMD program. Therefore, the history of Iraq’s aggressive behavior, 
and moreover, with Iraq having WMD capabilities, made Saddam what Clinton had declared: 
"The greatest threat to our security in the 21st century." An adducer to Clinton’s assertion is 
Saddam’s history of non-compliance, misleading UN inspectors, and Iraq’s industrial capacity 
through which biological weapons could be produced; all these factors in the aggregate 
contributed to the state's aggressive perception. 
The United States' and the UN Security Council’s objective was to disarm Iraq, and in doing so 
they provided many opportunities to avert war as a means to achieve this end. Security Council 
Resolution 1441 was in fact a final attempt for the regime to cooperate, and disarm. Alas, 
detractors would state that UN inspectors had inspected Iraq on numerous occasions with the 
objective of finding evidence of WMD; however, these inspections were to no avail, as no WMD 
was found. Yet, Richard Butler, UN arms inspector, stated in his reports to the UN that 
inspections were premised on Saddam’s cooperation. Regrettably, Saddam, a rational policy 
maker, was a power maximizer, for he was positing foreign policy, therein, an anarchic system. 
Indeed Iraq’s national interest was to ensure their WMD capacity remained surreptitious, thus, if 
WMD were not found, then it is perhaps a result of Saddam preserving the Iraqi national interest, 
instead of Iraq not having WMD 
The Saddam-led regime having access to WMD would lead to instability in the Middle East, as 
WMD would increase Iraq’s power relative to other Middle Eastern states. As such, the balance 
power would shift in favor of Iraq, which would allow Iraq to coerce its neighbors. The United 
States is influenced by its power position in the world and has an interest in maintaining stability 
throughout the world. President George H.W. Bush, Sr., went to war with Iraq, more precisely, 
when Iraq invaded Kuwait. To be clear, as a result of Iraq's actions the balance of power would 
shift in Iraq's favor.[43] The Bush Administration has done the same with Operation Iraqi 




To be honest, Iraq proved irrational, for Iraq had opportunities to comply with U.S. demands (see 
Figure 2 above). Unfortunately, Saddam chose not to cooperate, and as a regrettable 
consequence would upset the balance of power in the region. As such, Iraq posed a security 
threat. Therefore, the United States sought regime change to restore security. Saddam should 
have complied, especially after the United States had threatened Afghanistan with a commitment 
of war in the event the state did not comply. As Figure 2 demonstrates when Iraq resists, and the 
United States punishes, it is the most costly scenario. Iraq was a security concern, for it failed to 
comply. What is more, the potential harm the regime posed to the United States was less than 
the harm the United States posed to Saddam, in consequence, the scenario was indeed 
asymmetrical. Figure 2 gives an accurate portrayal of the bargaining the two states were engaged 
in regarding WMD. 
Balance of Threat theory pontificated by Stephen Walt would predict balancing against Iraq, for 
after Afghanistan the state was perceived as a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East. 
Iraq’s WMD ambition would lead to instability in the Middle East. Thus, the state's offensive 
intentions, and its aggregate power, proved menacing, for a stronger Iraq would upset the 
balance of power. Alas, the threat posed by Iraq was not perceived as an imminent one by the 
international community, for the state's offensive intentions did not lead to action.[44] However, 
the United States’ national security strategy was formulated in a world where security is not 
assured, therefore, preventive war, unilateral intervention, and regime change were called for to 
ameliorate U.S. security. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the United States promotes democracy as a distinct domestic political structure, for it is 
competent, and decreases anarchy in the international system. To be clear, peace and stability 
are assured—that is, if the United States exerts its military power. What is more, as a result of the 
U.S. presence abroad, there is indeed a peace among democratic states. The evaluation of the 
Bush Doctrine substantiates the assertion that the United States acts in a manner to assure 
international peace and stability. Above all, coercion was apposite, that is, as an expedient to 
security. Thus in the end, it is indeed veritable that as a consequence of anarchy and insecurity, 
the United States promotes, supports, and defends democracy. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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